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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
ELY V. VELDE THE APPLICATION OF
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TO
REVENUE SHARING PROGRAMS
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), a prin-
cipal congressional response to deterioration of the environment,
seeks to restore and maintain healthful and productive living condi-
tions2 by requiring federal agencies to comply with both substantive
and procedural duties3 in implementing the environmental policy set
forth in the statute.4 The primary thrust of NEPA is to require federal
agencies to consider environmental effects in evaluating "proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment. . . ... Recently, NEPA has
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et. seq. (1970). See generally H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969). For a summary of the developments culminating in the enactment of NEPA, see Note,
The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing?, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV.
139, 140-41 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (1970). The section sets forth the congressional declaration of policy
based upon a recognition of "the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all
components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population
growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and
expanding technological advances. ... The Congress further recognizes "the critical import-
ance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development
of man .... " Id.
3. Id. §§ 4331(b), 4332. See notes 14-20 infra and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). NEPA expresses a basic policy that the federal government
shall employ "all practicable means and measures. . . to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." Id. § 433 1(a).
The original Senate version of the measure included a statement recognizing that "each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment .... " This lan-
guage was deleted from the conference bill because of"doubt on thepart of the House conferees
with respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provision." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2767, 2768-69
(1969). As enacted, NEPA includes a provision indicating congressional recognition "that each
person should enjoy a healthful environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
For an examination of theories possibly justifying judicial recognition of a constitutional right
to enjoy a quality environment, see Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment,
56 VA. L. REV. 458, 459-73 (1970). But see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971)
("We decline to elevate to a constitutional level the concerns voiced by the appellants.").
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The House and Conference Reports are silent with
respect to the meaning of the terms "significantly affecting" the environment. It can reasonably
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been successfully invoked to compel federal administrative agencies
to consider the environmental effects of any proposed actions. Pres-
ently unresolved, however, is the question of whether a federal agency
in administering block grants of funds to states is within the ambit
of NEPA. This issue will assume increased importance with adoption
of federal revenue-sharing programs designed to assist states in fi-
nancing local projects.7 Resolution of the issue turns on the determi-
nation of the distinction, if any, between an agency subject to
NEPA's requirements and one whose enabling legislation precludes
it from giving effect to the congressional mandate. A corollary of the
first issue is a determination of the instrumentality responsible for
deciding whether NEPA applies to a particular agency action.
The legislative history of NEPA indicates that Congress did not
consider the operation of the measure with respect to essentially
unrestricted block grants of federal resources to states. Congressional
attention focused exclusively upon federal programs in which an
agency maintains an intimate and continuing role in the execution of
the program at the state level. However, a recent case, Ely v. Velde,8
has considered the issue of NEPA's application to block grants. In
Ely, the Fourth Circuit held that, in administering block grants to
local law enforcement agencies, the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) was not relieved from complying with
NEPA by virtue of the agency's enabling legislation9 which elimi-
nated federal discretionary authority over grant recipients in their use
of federal funds. In the context of that decision, this discussion will
explore the extent to which NEPA has expanded the grant of author-
ity to federal agencies and the implications of that expansion in rela-
tion to the block grant system of federal aid to states.
be inferred that providing a definition was left to the administrative branch, subject to judicial
review. Guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental Quality provide that this provision
"is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall, cumulative impact of the action
proposed." 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1970), reprinted in BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-FEDERAL LAWS
71:0302 (1970).
6. See, e.g.. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), affd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
7. See notes 64-66 infra.
8. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.), revg, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971) (the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's determination that NEPA was inapplicable to state officials named
as defendants in the action. This result is not relevant for purposes of the following discussion),
9. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3711, 3751-
69 (1970).
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NEPA: Its Supplementary Character and Duties
It is generally agreed that NEPA constitutes a grant of authority
supplementing agencies' existing authorizations and mandates.," The
basis for this conclusion is found'in section 105 of NEPA, which
states that the policies and goals set forth in the statute "are supple-
mentary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agen-
cies."" NEPA thus enlarges the responsibilities of federal agencies
insofar as it requires them to carry out the policies of the statute in
their major actions. Viewed in light of section 103,12 which directs
federal agencies to review their statutory authority to determine if
there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies in the legislation prevent-
ing full compliance with NEPA, section 105 appears to be a present
grant of authority except to the extent that such a grant would clearly
violate an agency's existing statutory responsibility. The acuracy of
this construction is supported unequivocally by the conference re-
port. 3
Assuming the validity of the interpretation of NEPA as a supple-
mental conferral of authority, the nature of the statutory grant of
power must be examined. Section 101 of NEPA broadly articulates
a continuing policy to use all practicable means to restore and main-
tain a quality environment. 4 The provision imposes upon federal
agencies the duty to carry out the policies of the statute "consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy ... .
The mechanisms employed to implement the substantive policies
of section 101 are the procedural requirements embodied in section
102.16 The most potent procedural technique is the requirement of
section 102(2)(c) that an environmental impact statement by the re-
10. See Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230, 251-65 (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970).
12. Id. § 4333.
13. This section [105] does not, however, obviate the requirement that the Federal
agencies conduct their activities in accordance with the provisions of this bill unless to
do so would clearly violate their existing statutory authorizations. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
765,91st Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1969), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2767,
2771 (1969) (emphasis added).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970). See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971), wherein the court read this provision as applying to
the substantive declarations of section 101 and not as diluting the procedural duties of section
102.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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sponsible official be included in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the environment. The statement must be detailed
and must treat certain matters, including the environmental impact
of the proposed action, any unavoidable adverse effects if the pro-
posal is implemented, alternatives to the proposed action, and any
irreversible commitment of resources necessitated if the action is
implemented. 7 The language of section 102 strongly suggests the
existence of a mandate. Congress "directs" that policies and laws
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the substan-
tive policies outlined in section 101 to the fullest extent possible.,8
Additionally, section 102 "directs" all federal agencies to accompany
proposals for major federal action with the prescribed impact state-
ment. 9 The legislative history of NEPA, moreover, clearly indicates
that the statute is to be implemented unless the existing law applica-
ble to an agency's operations "expressly prohibits or makes full com-
pliance with one of the directives [of NEPA] impossible.""0 Thus, the
expansive substantive policy declarations of section 101, although
phrased in discretionary terms, are reinforced by the strongly worded
procedural requirements in section 102 suggestive of a mandate.
17. Id. § 4332(C). In addition to amplifying the statutorily prescribed requirements, guide-
lines for federal agencies issued by the Council on Environmental Quality require "[w]here
appropriate, a discussion of problems and objections raised by other Federal, State, and local
agencies and by private organizations and individuals .... " 36 Fed. Reg. 7725 (1970),
reprinted in BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-FEDERAL LAWS 71:0302 (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The measure provides in pertinent part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (I) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this [Act], and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
.... Id.
19. Il. § 4332(C).
20. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2767, 2770 (1969) (emphasis added). Congressional intent, as revealed by
the legislative history, clarifies an ambiguity present in the language of section 102 itself. The
statutory language requiring compliance with NEPA "to the fullest extent possible" was clearly
not intended by Congress to operate as an escape clause. "[lI]t is the intent of the conferees
that the provision . . . shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding
compliance with the directives set out in section 102." Id.
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Title II of NEPA creates the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President 2' and lists its functions
and duties. 22 Despite the limited nature of its statutory authority,
which is confined to investigative and advisory functions, CEQ has
issued guidelines for federal agencies to round out the requirements
of section 102.23 Authority to so act is to be found in Executive Order
11514,24 which charges CEQ with the duty of issuing guidelines for
the preparation of detailed impact statements.2-
Since NEPA arguably contemplates no power in CEQ to enforce
statutory provisions, 26 suits under NEPA have been brought exclu-
sively by private interests. Judicial response to the measure in early
suits varied, with some courts labelling NEPA "nothing less than a
mandate"27 and others viewing it merely as a declaration of policy
which was insufficient to support a cause of action." The developing
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). The statute provides that the Council is to be composed of
three members designated by the President, subject to Senate confirmation. Certain qualifica-
tions requisite to appointment are designated by statute:
Each member shall be a person who, as a result of his training, experience, and attain-
ments, is exceptionally well qualified to analyze and interpret environmental trends and
information of all kinds; to appraise programs and activities of the Federal Government
in the light of the policy set forth in [section 101]; to be conscious of and responsive to
the sdientific, economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and interests of the Nation;
and to formulate and recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the
quality of the environment. Id.
22. Id. § 4344. The Council's duties include: (1) assisting and advising the President in
preparation of the Environmental Quality Report prescribed by NEPA; (2) gathering, analyz-
ing and interpreting information concerning conditions and trends in the quality of the environ-
ment; (3) reviewing and appraising programs and activities of the federal government; (4)
developing and recommending national policies to promote environmental improvement; and
(5) reporting at least annually to the President on the condition of the environment.
23. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1970), reprinted in BNA ENVIRONMENT LAW REP.-FEDERAL
LAWs 71:0301 (1970).
24. 3 C.F.R. § 531 (1971), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, at 10658 (1970).
25. Id. Neither the language of NEPA nor the President's executive order expressly author-
izes CEQ to "interpret" NEPA. However, it is within the power of the President to take any
action reasonable and necessary to execute a legislative enactment. Banks, Steel, Sawyer, and
the Executive Power, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 467, 514-16 (1953). The issuance of guidelines for
the preparation of impact statements is easily justifiable as reasonable and necessary means to
implement the action-forcing procedures of NEPA.
26. See generally Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolfs
Clothing?, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139, 142 (1970); Note, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury
?, 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 116, 122 (1971). But cf. Project, Federal Administrative Law
Developments-1970, 1971 DUKE L.J. 149, 171.
27. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 156 (D. Kan. 1971).
28. Bucklein v. Volpe, I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But see
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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trend, however, is toward a judicial recognition of the binding role
of NEPA within the general framework of administrative law. Ac-
cordingly, NEPA has been affirmatively applied to an agency loan
for park construction,2  termination of a federal production con-
tract,-" administrative rule-making,3" issuance of land-use permits
and to the authorization of a cross-state barge canal.3 3 Unlike these
cases, Ely involved a federal agency whose enabling legislation, the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Safe Streets Act),3 4
limits considerably the extent of discretionary authority enjoyed by
the agency in carrying out its statutory duties.
The Safe Streets Act and LEAA
The portion of the Safe Streets Act relevant to Ely is Title I,
which establishes LEAA and authorizes it to make grants to states
to aid law enforcement activities.3 5 The technique of employing
block grants, as distinguished from the categorical grant system
under which most federal programs operate, was written into the Safe
Streets Act to reduce the likelihood of federal domination of local
police efforts.3 1 Under the categorical grant system, the federal gov-
29. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources, I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. 1303 (W.D. Tex.),
vacated on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971).
31. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
33. Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
34. Id. §§ 3701 et. seq. (1970).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3711, 3751-69 (1970). The statute establishes LEAA as a part of
the Department of Justice "under the general authority of the Attorney General", id. § 3711 (a),
although provision is also made for an Administrator who "shall be the executive head of the
agency and shall exercise all administrative powers. ... Id. § 3711(b). The purpose of the
measure, in view of the "high incidence of crime in the United States", id. § 3701, is "to assist
State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by
national assistance." Id.
36. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 21083 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Celler), wherein it was sug-
gested that proposed statutory language should allay the "qualms about this bill having any
tendency to set up a Federal police force .... "; assurances were made that "[t]he act before
us does not contemplate a takeover of law enforcement functions by the Federal Government
or a complete subsidization of local law enforcement efforts . . . . [C]ontrol and supervision
[will remain] with the State and local authorities." Id. at 21089 (remarks of Mr. Rodino).
However, a threat to local autonomy was perceived by some legislators to result from granting
"enormous leverage" to governors over local law enforcement. "[T]he block grant amendment
will plunge the new Federal programs into continuing political controversies and partisan
rivalries between State and local governments, between Governors and mayors, between urban
areas and rural areas, and between State and local police." 114 CONG. REc. 14756 (1968)
(remarks of Senator Muskie).
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ernment sets the specific purpose and terms for the use of grant funds
by state and local governments. Typically, extensive federal control
over local recipients is maintained under this system.3 The block
grant method, on the other hand, provides for "overall approval of
Statewide comprehensive plans at the federal level, but the actual
devising and implementing of plans and programs at the State and
local level."38 In accordance with this model, the Safe Streets Act
provides that LEAA "shall make grants" if it has on file an approved
comprehensive state plan which comports with the generalized pur-
poses and requirements of the statute.39 Furthermore, the agency is
precluded from exercising control or supervisory powers over a state
law enforcement agency.
Ely v. Velde: An Accommodation of Block Grants with National
Environmental Policy
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia held in Ely that NEPA was not applicable to the construction
of a state prison medical center funded in part with a block grant
from LEAA under the authority of the Safe Streets Act.41 Plaintiffs,
residents of the area in which the center was to be constructed,
brought suit against the administrators of LEAA seeking to enjoin
allocation of funds for construction of the facility on the ground that
LEAA failed to consider the environmental impact of the facility on
the local area, which was characterized by the court as "a uniquely
historical and architecturally significant rural community."4 Upon
examining the relation between NEPA and the Safe Streets Act, the
court discerned a fundamental conflict in the application of the stat-
utes in the instant circumstances. The conflict perceived by the court
presumably arose by virtue of the criteria set forth in the Safe Streets
Act to be utilized by LEAA in making grants to the states, since
considerations specified by Congress did not include those mandated
by N EPA. Consequently, the court accepted LEAA's contention that
the Safe Streets Act prevented the agency from imposing conditions
37. 114 CONG. REC. 14753 (1968) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). See, e.g., Federal-Aid
Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1970), under which the Department of Transportation
is required to maintain close control over the planning and construction of authorized projects.
38. 114 CONG. REc. 14758 (1968) (remarks of Senator Thurmond).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3733 (1970).
40. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3711, 3751-69 (1970).
42. 321 F. Supp. at 1089.
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upon grantees not specified by the Safe Streets Act, despite the fact
that the measure pre-dated NEPA.4 3 According to the court, resolu-
tion of the conflict required an examination of the obligatory nature
of the two measures. Since Congress directed that federal programs
be administered in accordance with NEPA "to the fullest extent
possible," the court found that the measure was discretionary" in
nature inasmuch as agencies were expressly granted authority to de-
termine the extent to which NEPA would be implemented. On the
other hand, the court noted that the mandate of the Safe Streets Act
to make grants to states upon compliance with specified criteria did
not provide agencies with discretionary authority and that the non-
discretionary language of the statute precluded any application of
NEPA in the LEAA decision to grant funds for construction of the
center."
The court of appeals reversed in part." While the district court
found a conflict between NEPA and the Safe Streets Act which it
resolved by construing the former measure as discretionary and the
latter as non-discretionary, 47 the Fourth Circuit attempted to "dove-
tail" the statutes by piecing together the underlying policies of both
acts to create a coordinated federal scheme which would give effect
to the dominant features of each statute.18 Focusing on the Safe
Streets Act's provision ostensibly enjoining all federal
instrumentalities from exercising any "direction, supervision, or con-
trol" over a state law enforcement agency4 9 the appellate court ac-
knowledged the congressional attempt to strike a balance in assigning
roles to state and federal agencies in the delicate area of law enforce-
ment."0 The court observed that while the legislative history of the
statute is silent as to the precise scope of the provision, prevailing
43. The Safe Streets Act was passed in 1968, 82 Stat. 197, whereas NEPA was enacted in
1970, 83 Stat. 852.
44. 321 F. Supp. at 1093. The court did recognize, however, that the language "to the fullest
extent possible" was not intended to be an escape provision. Id. See note 20 supra and accompa-
nying text.
45. Id.
46. 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
47. The district court compared NEPA's language "to the fullest extent possible. . ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), with the Safe Streets Act's provision that "[t]he Administration shall
make grants ....... id. § 3733, and concluded that the two statutes were in conflict. 321 F.
Supp. at 1093.
48. 451 F.2d at 1137.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3766(a) (1970).
50. 451 F.2d at 1136.
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legislative opinion suggested that Congress was alert to the spectre
of a federal police force.5' Construing the statute as a whole in light
of this legislative concern, the court held that it was proper to read
the prohibition against federal interference narrowly and thus to con-
fine its effect to preclude intrusions into traditional state prerogatives
with respect to local police functions. A comprehensive approach to
the maintenance of the environment was not deemed within the ambit
of that disability. 2 As illustrative of an analogous federal "presence"
in the state law enforcement sphere, the court cited LEAA's practice
of conforming its activities with other federal legislation such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Model Cities Program. 3 In view
of this practice, requiring LEAA to implement NEPA in extending
federal grants would in no manner frustrate the congressional policy
of preventing "federalization" of local police agencies.
The court of appeals also dismissed another basis underlying the
district court's determination. The lower court emphasized that a
reviewing tribunal properly displays deference to the interpretation of
a statute by the agency charged with its administration.54 According
to the district court, when an administrative agency's interpretation
of its own legislation is under review, a court need not find that the
agency's construction is the only reasonable approach, nor that the
interpretation is one which would have been reached had the question
first arisen in judicial proceedings 55-to pass judicial scrutiny, the
interpretation need only be a reasonable one. In the instant case,
LEAA had interpreted the Safe Streets Act in such a manner that
the agency deemed it unnecessary to look beyond the Act's terms for
provisions of other federal statutes which might contradict the opera-
tion of the Safe Streets Act. In the district court's view, LEAA's
interpretation was not unreasonable.56 Relying on the general princi-
ple that administrative practice is not entitled to special weight when
it clashes with the interpretation given to statutes by other agencies
51. See note 3 supra. See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 227 (1968); 113
CONG. REc. 21188 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Hutchinson).
52. 451 F.2d at 1137.
53. Id.
54. 321 F. Supp. at 1093.
55. Id., citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). In Udall, the Supreme Court
promulgated a doctrine that the authoritative interpretation of a statute by an executive official
charged with its administration has the legal consequence of commanding deference from a
court if the interpretation is reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. See Project,
Federal Administrative Law Developments-I 971, 1972 Duke L.J. 115, 290.
56. 321 F. Supp. at 1094.
Vol. 1972:6671
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
created to administer them, the court of appeals refused to defer to
LEAA's interpretation of the Safe Streets Act.5" By the same token,
however, the court appeared to disregard CEQ's interpretation of
NEPA.58
Despite the result in the court of appeals, the litigation aptly
demonstrates the fundamental weaknesses in NEPA machinery. In
the instant case, while the impact of the proposed prison medical
facility might be localized, unquestionably the environment would be
significantly affected. The record in Ely is devoid of evidence contra-
dicting numerous experts' conclusions that degradation of the neigh-
borhood would result if the center were built. 9 Thus, construction of
the facility appears to be the type of action which, according to
CEQ's interpretation of section 102, would require an impact state-
ment. Nonetheless, LEAA determined otherwise in its section 103
report to CEQ. This result highlights the structural weakness of
CEQ, namely that its grant of authority may not contemplate en-
forcement powers. 0 The efficacy of NEPA therefore hinges on the
judicial response to suits brought by private interests."
LEAA's stance in the instant case raises the broad issue of ascer-
taining the administrative body which is empowered to determine the
extent to which NEPA supplements the existing authority of an
agency. Two possible alternatives are immediately apparent-the
agency whose authority is supplemented or the agency (CEQ) under
whose enabling legislation the supplemental authority is granted. One
approach in resolving the issue is to infer from CEQ's lack of enforce-
ment power that it must not have been intended by Congress to be
the appropriate agency to determine NEPA's applicability to other
57. 451 F.2d at 1135-36 n.14, citing United States v. Townsley, 323 U.S. 557, 568 (1945).
58. The court did indicate that "The Council on Environmental Quality, as the agency
created by NEPA, interprets its governing statute as binding on all federal agencies, 'unless
existing law applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance
impossible.'" 451 F.2d at 1135-36 n.14, quoting CEQ Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971),
reprinted in BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-FEDERAL LAWS 71:0301 (1970). However, the court
showed no explicit deference to that interpretation.
59. Joint Appendix of the parties, submitted in Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
(The Joint Appendix included excerpts from the reporter's transcript). The lack of expert
testimony which might have contradicted the testimony of plaintiffs' experts was due to
LEAA's contention that it was not required to consider the environmental impact of the project.
The court of appeals reserved judgment on the factual question of whether the proposed prison
facility would cause adverse environmental effects. Id. at 1138-39.
60. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
61. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917, 918 (1971).
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agencies. Moreover, the language employed by Congress directing
that laws be interpreted and administered in accordance with NEPA
policies "to the fullest extent possible" can reasonably be interpreted
to suggest that, since each agency is in the best position to assess the
degree of consideration of environmental effects possible in its opera-
tions, power to determine the measure's applicability rests with each
agency. Under this approach, a reviewing court would necessarily
determine the validity of an agency's interpretation through an analy-
sis of the reasonableness of the construction, giving due weight to the
presumption of validity which attaches to an agency's interpretation
of its governing statutes. 2 Under such circumstances the administra-
tive interpretation might not be deemed unreasonable and, if the
interpretation were similar to that of LEAA, the agency could thus
ignore NEPA. On the other hand, in light of the President's Execu-
tive Order directing CEQ to establish guidelines for the preparation
of section 102(2)(c) impact statements, a rational argument could be
made in favor of conceding to CEQ the function of interpreting the
extent of NEPA's supplemental grant of authority, at least with re-
spect to the procedures specified by NEPA. The logic of the latter
approach is convincing inasmuch as the legislation which effected the
supplement of authority also created an agency expressly charged
with the duty to review and appraise various federal programs in light
of the substantive policies and procedural duties of Title I of the
statute.13 In view of the language creating CEQ and the subsequent
Executive Order, it would, at the least,.seem reasonable to conclude
that vis-h-vis other agencies CEQ is the agency which could properly
be vested with the power to determine the extent of NEPA's applica-
bility. The desirability of this approach, however, is a persuasive
reason for its adoption. Empowering an agency established expressly
for the purpose of implementing NEPA with authority to determine
the statute's applicability will better assure that the national environ-
mental policy promulgated by Congress will be effectively imple-
mented. Under this approach, therefore, the only power of adminis-
trative agencies under NEPA would be either to comply with the
procedural provisions of the Act, as interpreted by CEQ, or to report
to CEQ under section 103 of NEPA that statutory authorizations
expressly prohibit compliance or make compliance impossible.
62. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1970). See discussion of Title I of NEPA, in notes 11-20 supra
and accompanying text.
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The Ely Rationale and Revenue Sharing
Ely is of special significance because the decision of the Fourth
Circuit focuses attention on the potential conflict between NEPA and
block grants to the states. The block grant approach, with its empha-
sis on minimizing federal control over local affairs, led LEAA to
argue that it was precluded from applying NEPA to its procedures
in approving state plans. With the proposed shift in federal assistance
programs from the conventional categorical programs to a system of
block grants embodied in the General 4 and Special Revenue Shar-
ing" bills presently before Congress, adoption of a restrictive view of
NEPA's applicability to block grants may pose a primary threat to
comprehensive federal environmental protection.
Although General and Special Revenue Sharing proposals vary
in such respects as the formulae employed in allocating federal re-
sources, the main thrust of these proposals is toward a reduction of
federal controls on the use of grants and a corresponding expansion
of states' discretion.6" At present, the only federal control applied
uniformly to revenue sharing bills is the requirement that agencies
administer the funds in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VI).67 Except to this limited extent, state autonomy is largely
left intact.
The arguments marshalled by LEAA in Ely can be expected to
appear in a case testing the effect of NEPA on an agency administer-
ing revenue sharing funds. While the Fourth Circuit looked to the
unique policy underlying the Safe Streets Act and determined that the
restraints on federal control embodied in the measure were more
limited than LEAA perceived, 8 a court focusing on the purposes of
revenue sharing legislation would be confronted with a legislative
history in which broadsides were levelled at the basic notion of federal
control over funds granted to states.69 A court would be hard-pressed
64. S. 680, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 4187, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
65. See, e.g., S. 1693, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
66. See generally Agnew, The Case for Revenue Sharing, 60 GEo. LJ, 7, 9-21 (1971).
Corman, Grave Doubts About Revenue Sharing, 60 GEo. L.J. 29, 34-37 (1971); Rockefeller,
Revenue Sharing-A View from the Statehouse, 60 Geo. L.J. 45 (1971); The Question of
Federal Revenue Sharing With the States: Pro & Con, 48 CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST 225 (1969).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
68. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
69. See President Nixon's message to Congress, accompanying introduction of S. 1693, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), 117 CONG. REc. H1750-51 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1971),
In simplest terms this program means returning Federal tax dollars to States and to local
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to answer that federal environmental control was intended to be
"dovetailed" with such legislation. Indeed, it could easily be argued
that the express provision as to the applicability of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 gives rise to a negative presumption that Congress in-
tended to place additional conditions on otherwise unrestricted block
grants. Inasmuch as the Ely rationale would be easily distinguishable
in this situation, the probable result would be that no federal agency
administering block grants would be required to consider the policies
of NEPA in its decisions, absent a judicial determination to the
contrary. Together with NEPA's inapplicability to state agencies,
this result would render the statute nugatory to a substantial degree.
In view of the possibility of such a development, CEQ could draft
an amendment to be included in proposed revenue sharing bills mak-
ing NEPA expressly applicable. Should courts follow the Fourth
Circuit's implicit conclusion in Ely that CEQ's interpretations of
NEPA are not binding upon other agencies, such an amendment,
despite the possibility of a judicial determination that no conflict
between NEPA and a particular statute exists, would be essential to
the continuing viability of NEPA as a meaningful approach to reha-
bilitation of the environment. However, should courts give recogni-
tion to CEQ's power to interpret the applicability of NEPA's proce-
dural provisions, such an amendment may well be unnecessary.
communities for investment in transportation-without the usual federal controls and
restraints (emphasis added).
The President further noted:
State and local governments, after all, have often been particularly responsive to citizen
pressure in these areas and they have frequently acted as bold pioneers in meeting these
concerns. I am confident that as more responsibility is given to governments closer to
the people, the true and abiding interests of the people will be even better reflected in
public policy decisions. Id. at H 1753.
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